Modeling the operational risk in Iranian commercial banks: case study of a private bank by Omid Momen et al.
Momen et al. Journal of Industrial Engineering International 2012, 8:15
http://www.jiei-tsb.com/content/8/1/15CASE STUDY Open AccessModeling the operational risk in Iranian
commercial banks: case study of a private bank
Omid Momen1,2*, Alimohammad Kimiagari2 and Eaman Noorbakhsh1,3Abstract
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision from the Bank for International Settlement classifies banking risks into
three main categories including credit risk, market risk, and operational risk. The focus of this study is on the
operational risk measurement in Iranian banks. Therefore, issues arising when trying to implement operational risk
models in Iran are discussed, and then, some solutions are recommended. Moreover, all steps of operational risk
measurement based on Loss Distribution Approach with Iran's specific modifications are presented. We employed
the approach of this study to model the operational risk of an Iranian private bank. The results are quite reasonable,
comparing the scale of bank and other risk categories.
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Nowadays, risk management becomes an important mod-
ule of every industry. However, its magnitude in banking
industry is much more obvious because, usually, the profit
of every bank is directly related to the amount of risk it
takes. It means that the more risk it takes, the more profit
it can earn. However, this huge amount of risk should be
carefully managed in order to reduce the possibility of loss
or bankruptcy. Therefore, the Bank for International Set-
tlements (BIS) has founded the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (hereafter Basel Committee), which has
developed several documents containing basic standards,
guidelines, and consultative papers for risk management
and banking supervision. One of the most recent and
well-known documents of BIS is Basel II accord. It
includes the most popular and trusted guidelines in bank-
ing supervision and risk management, which are generally
acquiesced by central banks all over the world including
the Central Bank of Iran.a
Basel II accord has classified major banking risks into
three different types: credit risk, market risk, and oper-
ational risk. Credit risk is an investor's risk of loss arising
from a borrower who does not make payments as pro-
mised. Market risk is the risk that the value of a* Correspondence: omid.momen@aut.ac.ir
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in any medium, provided the original work is pportfolio, either an investment portfolio or a trading
portfolio, will decrease due to the change in value of the
market risk factors. The four standard market risk fac-
tors are stock prices, interest rates, foreign exchange
rates, and commodity prices. Operational risk, which is
the main focus of this study based on Basel II accord,
has been defined as the risk of loss resulting from inad-
equate or failed internal processes, people and systems,
or from external events. This definition includes legal
risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision 2006).
In the last two decades, a significant number of financial
institutions have experienced loss or bankruptcy due to the
mismanagement of operational risks. Some famous
instances are as follows: First, Societe Generale Bank,
alleged fraud by a trader, lost 4.9 billion € in 2008. Second,
Former currency trader was accused of hiding US $691
million in losses at Allfirst Bank of Baltimore in 2002.
Third, UK's Barings Bank collapsed after trader Nick
Leeson lost £860 million (US $1.28 billion at the time) on
futures trades in 1995 (BBC News 2008). For more related
cases, go to Gallati (2003). In the case of Iran, most of the
banks have been state-owned up to a few years ago, and the
government has prevented them from insolvency. However,
emerging of private banks, along with service development
of both private and state-owned banks in recent years, led
in to a more competitive market, which encounters banks
with more complex operational risks that need to bean Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
Momen et al. Journal of Industrial Engineering International 2012, 8:15 Page 2 of 10
http://www.jiei-tsb.com/content/8/1/15considered. Since the operational risk has greatly affected a
large number of banks globally, as seen in non-Iranian
cases above, and due to the lack of attention to the subject
in Iranian banks and legislators, a new trend of research in
this area is indispensable.
Measuring is one of the main steps in operational risk
management. Basel II accord introduces three different
ways for measuring operational risk in financial institu-
tion: the first method is Basic Indicator Approach (BIA),
which calculates Capital-at-Risk (CaR) as a fraction of the
bank's gross income; the second proposed method is
called Standardized Approach (SA), which divides the in-
stitution into eight specified business lines and, in each
one, computes the business line-specific CaRs as a per-
centage of their relevant gross incomes then adds these
eight CaRs to obtain the bank's total CaR; and finally,
Basel II suggests Advanced Measurement Approaches
(AMA) in which banks are permitted to develop their
own methodology to assess yearly operational risk expos-
ure within a confidence interval of 99.9% or more. The
first two methods are easy to apply but undesirable among
banks because, as a consequence of their conceptual sim-
plicity, BIA and SA models do not provide any insights
into drivers of ethods in Iran, refer to Karafarin Bank
(2009) and Erfanian and Sharbatoghli (2006). However,
the third category of methods (i.e., AMA) has not been
implemented in any bank in Iran, which is much more
sensitive to risk; therefore, it is recommended by Basel
Committee and widely applied by international banks.
Among the eligible variants of AMA, over the last few
years, a statistical model widely used in the insurance
sector and often referred to as the Loss Distribution Ap-
proach (LDA) has become a standard in the banking in-
dustry around the world (for two examples see Chapelle
et al. (2007) and Aue and Kalkbrener (2006)). Anyway,
to our knowledge, it is not employed by any bank in
Iran. When applying the LDA in Iranian banking cir-
cumstance, some issues arise: First, operational loss
events have not been recorded thoroughly, so available
loss data are rare and inferences of their related distribu-
tions need special concern. Second, because there is no
bankruptcy reported, there are no data available for ex-
treme losses. Third, the previous methods implemented
in Iran (BIA and SA) do not explicitly account for de-
pendence structure of risks. Therefore, the objective of
this study is to present the comprehensive LDA frame-
work for the measurement of operational risk of banks
in Iran, whereas we try to provide recommendations to
resolve Iran's specific issues by utilizing available statis-
tical and mathematical techniques.
The methodology of this study has been applied in
Karafarin Bank, which is an Iranian private bank. For
more information about Karafarin Bank, visit its home
page (Karafarin Bank 2010).This paper is organized as follows: in ‘Methodology’, a
comprehensive methodology of measuring operational
risk is discussed; then in ‘Empirical analysis’, we apply
the methodology to loss data of Karafarin Bank, and
results are reported. Finally, concluding remarks will be
presented in the last section.
Case description
Methodology
The Basel Committee encourages banks to use Advanced
Measurement Approaches for modeling operational risk.
Although AMA includes a wide range of proprietary mod-
els, the most popular one is by far the Loss Distribution
Approach (Chapelle et al. 2007). LDA is a parametric
technique that estimates two separate distributions for fre-
quency and severity of operational losses and then com-
bines them through n-convolutionb (see Frachot et al.
(2001) for details). However, as mentioned before, the
basic LDA encounters some problems when applied to
Iranian banks, which suffer from loss data unavailability,
unreported large losses, and lack of attention to depend-
ence structure of operational risks.
The Basel Committee has provided a basic framework
that banks should use to classify their operational loss
data. This framework includes seven operational risk event
categories and eight banking business lines. In order to
comply with Basel II, it is necessary to consider this classi-
fication as presented in Table 1. For more definitions and
instances about the categories, see ‘Annexes 8 and 9’ of
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006).
LDA should be applied in all cells of Table 1 separately,
and then, the resulting loss distributions will be integrated
considering the dependence structure. In order to keep
the integrity of the methodology in the following sections
(‘Frequency distribution’, ‘Severity distribution’, ‘Loss distri-
bution for a specified risk category’, and ‘Loss distribution
for bank as a whole’), the comprehensive methodology of
measuring operational risk in a commercial bank will be
described as presented in Figure 1.
Frequency distribution
In LDA, occurrence of operational losses of a specified
bank is modeled by a so-called frequency distribution.
This distribution is discrete and, for short periods of time,
usually estimated either by Poisson or by negative bino-
mial distributions (Aue and Kalkbrener 2006). The differ-
ence between these two distributions is that the intensity
parameter is deterministic in the first case and stochastic
in the second. More precisely, if the intensity of a Poisson
process follows a gamma distribution, the negative bino-
mial distribution arises (Embrechts et al. 2003).
In this study, a score-based approach (see Panjer
(2006) and Klugman et al. (2004)) has been used for
selecting between the Poisson and negative binomial
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proach, three different statistic hypothesis tests have
been utilized including Cramer-von Mises (Anderson
1962), Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Stephens 1974), and likeli-
hood ratio (McGee 2002).Severity distribution
Modeling severity distribution for economical impact of
operational losses is not as straightforward as modeling
frequency of losses. Some studies like Chapelle et al.
(2007) and de Fontnouvelle et al. (2004) indicate that
classical distributions are unable to fit the entire range
of observations for modeling the severity of operational
losses. Hence, as in Alexander (2003), Chapelle et al.
(2007), de Fontnouvelle et al. (2004), and King (2001), in
this study, the discrimination between ordinary (i.e., high
frequency/low impact) and large (i.e., low frequency/high
impact) losses has been considered, as presented in
Figure 2. The ‘ordinary distribution’ includes all losses in
a limited range denoted [L; U] (L being the collection
threshold used by the bank), while the ‘extreme distribu-
tion’ generates all the losses above the cut-off threshold
U. The severity distribution will then be defined as a
mixture of the corresponding mutually exclusive
distributions.
For modeling ordinary losses, distribution such as the
exponential, Weibull, gamma, or lognormal distribution
that is strictly positive continuous distribution can be






Figure 1 Methodology flowchart of measuring operational risk in a cparametric density function, where θ denotes the vector
of parameters, and let F(x;θ) be the cumulative distribu-
tion function (cdf ) associated with f(x;θ). Then, the dens-
ity function f*(x;θ) of the losses in [L; U] can be
expressed as
f  x; θð Þ ¼ f x; θð Þ
F U ; θð Þ  F L; θð Þ ð1Þ
The corresponding log-likelihood function is:




fi xi; θð Þ
F U ; θð Þ  F L; θð Þ
 
ð2Þ
where x1; . . . ; xNð Þ is the sample of observed ordinary
losses. It should be maximized in order to be estimated
(Chapelle et al. 2007).
In Iranian banks, due to lack of recorded operational
loss data, modeling distribution of large losses is not as
clear-cut as ordinary losses because there are not enough
observations available for severe operational losses
(Momen 2008). For such samples, classical maximum
likelihood methods yield inappropriate distributions for
estimating the occurrence probability of exceptional losses
because the resulting distributions are not sufficiently
heavy tailed. To resolve this issue, a procedure developed
by Chapelle et al. (2007) has been used. This procedure is
built upon the results of Balkema and de Haan (1974) and
Pickands (1975), which state that, for a broad class of dis-
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Figure 2 Schematic diagram discriminating between ordinary and large losses.
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distribution (GPD) with parameters ξ (shape index or tail
parameter), β (the scale index), and U (the location index).
The GPD can thus be thought of as the conditional distri-
bution of X given X>U (Embrechts et al. 1997).
As indicated before, another problem with operational
risk modeling in Iranian banks is that large catastrophic
losses like bankruptcy of a bank have not been reported.
Hence, tail of the severity distribution cannot be mod-
eled precisely. This problem is somehow specific to Iran
and other developing countries. North American and
European banks have access to operational risk data-
bases like AlgorithmicsW and ORXW. Since Iranian banks
do not have access to such databases, the well-known
method of scaling external data (see Shih et al. (2000)
for a review and refer to Aue and Kalkbrener (2006),
Chapelle et al. (2007), and Moscadelli (2005) for some
applications) is not applicable to them. Therefore, we
used a scenario analysis approach to enrich operational
loss database with catastrophic losses (and ordinary
losses if needed).
In scenario analysis approach, banking experts are asked
to provide following information about operational risks:
 Scenario configuration (which event or combination of
events)
 Impact assessment (how much can it cost)
 Frequency of occurrences (how many times can it
happen)
Loss distribution for a specified risk category
In LDA, the loss for the business line i and the event
type j between times t and t þ τ is:
ϑ i; jð Þ ¼
XN i;jð Þ
n¼1
ξn i; jð Þ ð3Þ
where i and j are indices of Table 1, and ξ i; jð Þ is the ran-
dom variable that represents the amount of one loss
event for the business line i and the event type j (which
follows severity distribution). The loss severity distribu-
tion of ξ i; jð Þ is denoted by Fi,j. N(i,j) is a random
variable indicating the number of events between
times t and t þ τ, which has a probability function pi,j
(frequency distribution).
Let Gi;j be the distribution of ϑ i; jð Þ. Gi;j is then a com-
pound distribution:
Gi;j xð Þ ¼
X1
n¼1
pi;j nð ÞFni;j xð Þ; x > 0
pi;j 0ð Þ; x ¼ 0
8<
: ð4Þ
where * is the convolution operator on distribution func-
tions, and Fn* is the n-fold convolution of F with itself
(Frachot et al. 2001).In general, there is no analytical expression of the
compound distribution (Feller 1968; Frachot et al. 2001).
Therefore, computing the loss distribution requires
using a numerical algorithm. The most widely used algo-
rithms are the Monte Carlo method (Fishman 1996;
Panjer 2006), Panjer's recursive approach (Panjer 1981),
and the inverse of the characteristic function (Heckman
and Meyers 1983; Robertson 1992).
In this study, the Monte Carlo method is used for
computing the loss distribution for each cell in Table 1
(Fishman 1996). This method includes the following
steps:
1. One random draw from the frequency distribution is
taken (n).
2. n random draws from the severity distribution are
taken (for example: first draw US $5,000,000, second
draw US $1,200,000, . . ., the nth draw US $12,500,000).
3. The US dollar value of losses is summed
(for example: US $45,000,000 result is one
observation in aggregate loss distribution).
4. The above steps should be repeated m times
(for example: 1,000,000 times).
These m observations are used to model the loss dis-
tribution for an individual cell of Table 1.
Loss distribution for bank as a whole
The methodology outlined in the sections ‘Frequency
distribution’, ‘Severity distribution’, and ‘Loss distribution
for a specified risk category’ is applicable to a specified
category of operational loss data (i.e., one cell of Table 1
which is calculated in one loop of Figure 1.) However, in
order to comply with Basel II, one should consider all 56
categories of risks according to Table 1. For this pur-
pose, Basel Committee recommends calculating the total
capital charge of the bank by simple summation of the
capital charges of all 56 risk categories; by this proposal,
Basel Committee has assumed a perfect positive depend-
ence between the risks implicitly. In spite of this, banks
are interested in considering the dependence structure
by other appropriate techniques because the basic as-
sumption of Basel Committee will result in large
requirements of capital; therefore, banks will have an
unacceptable high level of opportunity costs (Aue and
Kalkbrener 2006; Chapelle et al. 2007; Moscadelli 2005).
Traditionally, correlation is used to model dependence
between variables (risk categories here), but recent stud-
ies show the superiority of copula over correlation for
modeling dependence due to higher flexibility of the
copula compared to conventional correlation. Another
important reason to choose copula instead of correlation
is that the latter is unable to model dependence between
extreme events (Kole et al. 2007), which are the main
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study, the dependence among aggregate losses will be
modeled by copulas in order to combine the marginal
distributions of different risk categories into a single
joint distribution. A brief definition of copula follows:
Copula. A copula is a multivariate joint distribution
defined on the n-dimensional unit cube [0,1]n in a
way that every marginal distribution is uniform in
the interval [0,1]. Specifically, C : 0; 1½ n ! 0:1½  is an
n-dimensional copula (briefly, n-copula) if
1. C uð Þ ¼ 0 whenever u 2 0; 1½ n has at least one
component equal to 0.
2. C uð Þ ¼ ui whenever u 2 0; 1½ n has all the
components equal to 1 except the ith one, which is
equal to ui.
3. C uð Þ is n-increasing, i.e., for each hyper rectangle
4.




1ð ÞN zð ÞC zð Þ≥0 ð5Þ
5. where N zð Þ ¼ card k=zk ¼ xkf g. VC Bð Þ is the so-
called C-volume of B (for more details see Cherubini
et al. (2004), Genest and McKay (1986), Nelsen (1999),
and Panjer (2006)).There are various types of copulas in the literature. In
this study, we decide to employ a multivariate copula,
which is more applicable in practice; the traditional can-
didate for modeling dependence is Gaussian copula (for
application of this copula in a real bank see Aue and
Kalkbrener (2006)). However, due to the following four
reasons, we preferred a multidimensional t-copula over
it: First, operational loss distributions share some similar
characteristics with asset portfolio (like skewness, heavy
tails, and tail dependence); according to the findings of
Kole et al. (2007) for asset portfolio, their procedure pro-
vides clear evidence against Gaussian copula but does
not reject the t-copula. Second, t-copula assigns more
probability to tail events than the Gaussian copula,
which makes it appropriate in operational risk modeling
where extreme losses are a subject of more concern for
banks. Third, t-copula exhibits tail dependence, which is









BLET, Business Line Event Type.copula is capable of modeling dependence in the tail
without giving up the flexibility to model dependence in
the center (Kole et al. 2007); it means that this copula
fits well in the entire range of observations. However, to
our knowledge, the usage of this copula in a real bank
has not been reported anywhere in the world.
t-copula. Multivariate t-copula (MTC) is defined as
follows:
TR;υ u1; u2; . . . ; unð Þ¼tR;υ t1υ u1ð Þ; t1υ u2ð Þ; . . . ;t1υ unð Þ
 
ð6Þ
where R is a symmetric, positive definite matrix with
diag Rð Þ ¼ 1; 1; . . . ; 1ð ÞT , and tR;υ is the standardized
multivariate Student's t distribution with correlation
matrix R and υ degrees of freedom. tυ  1 is the inverse
of the univariate cdf of Student's t distribution with υ
degrees of freedom. Using the canonical representation,
it turns out that the copula density for the MTC is


















where ςj ¼ t1υ uj
 
(Cherubini et al. 2004). Using t-copula,
we can now calculate the Capital-at-Risk of the
bank.
Capital-at-Risk. With LDA, the capital charge (or the
Capital-at-Risk) is a Value-at-Risk measure of risk, which
is defined as follows:
Given some confidence level α 2 0; 1ð Þ , the Value-
at-Risk (VaR) at the confidence level α is given by
the smallest number l in a way that the probability
that the loss L exceeds l is not larger than (1− α)
(McNeil et al. 2005):
VaRa ¼ inf l 2 R : P L > lð Þ≤1 af g
¼ inf l 2 R : FL≥af g ð8Þ
The left equality is a definition of VaR. The right
equality assumes an underlying probability distribution,
which makes it true only for the parametric VaR. The
left equality means that we are 100(1− α)% confidentTable 3 Distribution of loss data
1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
Frequency (%) 61 28 6 4
Severity (%) 4 53 1 42
Table 4 Frequency distribution results
Distribution Parameter(s) Cramer-von Mises Kolmogorov-Smirnov Log-likelihood
1,1 Negative binomial (0.0034,4.9739) 9.3202 0.1786 218.99
Poisson 1440.6 9.3224 0.5058 3498.65
2,1 Negative binomial (0.0023,2.0416) 6.989 0.1569 160.88
Poisson 882 6.9997 0.6666 542.3
1,2 Negative binomial (0.0247,6.734) 4.9528 0.1822 90.16
Poisson 266.4 4.8982 0.5325 366.86
2,2 Negative binomial (0.0059,1.7478) 3.3195 0.1494 66.1
Poisson 294.9 3.3179 0.4999 740.59
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Operational loss data of Karafarin Bank have been iden-
tified and categorized according to the Basel II Event
Types (ETs) as follows:
1. Internal fraud
2. External fraud
3. Employment practices and workplace safety
4. Clients, products, and business practices
5. Damage to physical assets
6. Business disruption and system failures
7. Execution, delivery, and process management
For more detailed classification, definition, and exam-
ples of these risk categories, please see ‘Annex 9’ of Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2006). Related data
of each of the above risk categories have been gathered
in eight Basel II defined Business Lines (BLs) as follows:
1. Corporate finance
2. Trading and sales
3. Retail banking
4. Commercial banking
5. Payment and settlement
6. Agency services
7. Asset management
8. Retail brokerageTable 5 Scenario analysis summary table
Basel II
classification





CAM, customer/client account management; CI, customer intake and documentatio
amount of loss in Iranian rials in 1 year; TC, trade counterparties; TCEM, transactionPlease see ‘Annex 8’ of Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2006) for more information about activity
groups and principle for business line mapping.
A combination of seven ETs and eight BLs provides a
56-cell matrix (Business Line Event Type) as presented
in Table 1. Data of this matrix are used for all oper-
ational risk calculations.
Karafarin Bank, in line with other banks (for example,
Deutsche Bank (Aue and Kalkbrener 2006), National
Bank of Belgium (Chapelle et al. 2007), and Bank of Italy
(Moscadelli 2005)) considers its operational loss data as
confidential; however, main operational risk events
related to this study are software and hardware failures,
disruption in telecommunication, data entry error,
accounting error, collateral management failure, inaccur-
ate reports, incomplete legal documents, unauthorized ac-
cess to accounts, damage to client assets, and vendor
disputes. The methodology mentioned in the section ‘Case
description’ (Figure 1) was applied to Karafarin Bank data.
All data in 56 loss categories have been considered
and collected, but due to the scarcity of data, only four
cells were used for modeling in this study, as presented
in Table 2. Distribution of loss data in the four concern-
ing cells is presented in Table 3. For the sake of confi-
dentiality, all data have been multiplied by a constant
scalar and then used in calculations.
In order to estimate frequency distributions, we employed
the methodology presented in the section ‘Frequency
distribution’. Three different goodness-of-fit tests were
used including Cramer-von Mises, Kolmogorov-Smir-
nov, and log-likelihood. In order to provide a reliableExecution, delivery, and process management
M M & R CI CAM TC V & S
S F S F S F S F S F S
n; F, number of occurrences in 1 year; M & R, monitoring and reporting; S, total
capture, execution, and maintenance; V & S, vendors and suppliers.
Table 6 Severity distribution results for cell (1,1)
1,1 Distribution Parameter(s) Anderson-Darling Cramer-von Mises Kolmogorov-Smirnov Log-likelihood
Ordinary
losses
Exponential 403400 153.56 128.3329 0.4566 5553.93
Extreme value (800600,1016000) 199.22 128.3333 0.501 6518.25
Gamma (0.3053,1321100) 4.9381 128.3215 0.1423 5165.82
Generalized extreme value (3.4248,32722,9523.2) 52.2085 128.3323 0.3679 5345.78
Generalized Pareto (2.5217,22679) 26.762 128.3307 0.06731 5135.49
Lognormal (10.6559,3.4317) 19.1277 128.3295 0.098 5122.04
Weibull (186000,0.4277) 11.8198 128.3244 0.0893 5124.39
Large losses Generalized Pareto (0.2167,3546300,3809600)
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Aue and Kalkbrener (2006) used one. Another point
here is that weighted sum method (Triantaphyllou
2002) was employed in order to guarantee the conver-
gence of several individual goodness-of-fit tests to one
best-fitted distribution (see Momen (2008) for details).
Analysis of this study like Chapelle et al. (2007),
approved the selection of negative binomial distribu-
tion for all risk categories, which was confirmed by dis-
persion analysis (i.e., variance of frequencies are greater
than their mean) as shown in Table 4.
With the intention of estimating severity distribution,
the methodology presented in the section ‘Severity distri-
bution’ was followed. By using this method, the first bar-
rier for Iranian banks in measuring operational risk (i.e.,
the effect of insufficient recorded losses) was resolved.
We tested the fitness of exponential, Weibull, lognor-
mal, gamma, extreme value, generalized extreme value,
and generalized Pareto distributions for modeling of
economic impact of ordinary operational losses. In order
to select among the above mentioned distributions, An-
derson-Darling, Cramer-von Mises, Kolmogorov-Smir-
nov, and log-likelihood goodness-of-fit tests were
employed. This diversification among distributions and
tests increases the reliability of distribution selection
procedure.Table 7 Severity distribution results for cell (1,2)
















Generalized Pareto (0.3571,90367000,50082000)In the present work, in order to resolve the second
problem of Iranian banks in calculating operational risk
(i.e., unreported immense losses), additional examples
and descriptions of real large loss events, as recom-
mended by Basel Committee, have been provided
(Momen 2008). Therefore, bank experts have been asked
to provide scenarios about frequency and severity of
large losses in 1 year. These scenarios have been sum-
marized in spreadsheets, like Table 5, and added to the
database of operational losses of the bank in order to en-
rich it with enough large losses.
This type of scenario analysis is more explainable to the
management and adds benefits of expert ideas to the
quantitative calculations, while previous works in Iran like
Erfanian and Sharbatoghli (2006) has missed experts' ideas
and only relayed on data of gross income. Tables 6, 7, 8,
and 9 show the results of fitting severity distribution for
Karafarin Bank's data. Aggregate operational losses for
each cell are estimated using Monte Carlo simulation, and
approximate distributions are presented in Table 10.
According to the section ‘Loss distribution for bank as
a whole’, for the aim of integrating different aggregate
distributions, we decided to model operational loss of
banks using t-copula, which solves the third problem for
Iranian banks (i.e., missed dependence structure of risk








02 64.333324 0.5919 3413.78
7 64.333332 0.4831 3907.8
4 64.319297 0.1563 2883.33
2 64.333007 0.3678 3019.36
6 64.330906 0.116 2890.69
8 64.326428 0.0574 2859.47
7 64.321569 0.0836 2860.82
Table 8 Severity distribution results for cell (2,1)
2,1 Distribution Parameter(s) Anderson-Darling Cramer-von Mises Kolmogorov-Smirnov Log-likelihood
Ordinary losses Exponential 376370 19.3114 18.999946 0.4809 825.58
Extreme value (595510,457840) 8.17 18.999992 0.3981 915.56
Gamma (0.4791,785640) 0.7217 18.999279 0.1956 777.48
Generalized extreme value (1.1516,136860,87175) 7.852 18.999882 0.368 807.17
Generalized Pareto (0.2377,294460) 2.1162 18.999679 0.1348 775.66
Lognormal (11.5036,2.7569) 1.4252 18.99966 0.1063 774.32
Weibull (288120,0.6192) 0.9279 18.999382 0.1502 774.25
Large losses Generalized Pareto (0.7,760080,2190300)
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bank in the published works.
According to the definition of Capital-at-Risk and the
confidentiality factor (multiplied by all raw loss data),
Capital-at-Risk of Karafarin Bank modeled with t-copula
and 99.9% confidence level is equal to (Momen 2008):
CaR ¼ 746286286124 ﬃ 7:4 1011 IRRð Þc
This means that with a 99.9% of confidence, the oper-
ational loss of Karafarin Bank will not be greater than 7:4
1011 IRRð Þ . This result quite satisfied the management of
Karafarin Bank because it is in tune with their presump-
tions of operational risk, and it is reasonable compared to
the scale of market and credit risk exposures. Moreover, as
presented in Table 11, it requires much less capital com-
pared to other approaches that are provided by Basel II.
Therefore, by using the present model, banks have the op-
portunity to use the extra unallocated capital for creating
further income within a controlled level of operational risk.Conclusions
In this paper, a comprehensive methodology of oper-
ational risk assessment was addressed. To our knowledge,
there are no published works to model operational risk of
an Iranian commercial bank appropriately; the main rea-
son is the existence of some inconveniences to measure
operational risk using available methods. Therefore, our
main objective was to propose a practical framework forTable 9 Severity distribution results for cell (2,2)









Generalized Pareto (0.2395,210330) 1.33
Lognormal (107199,2.7984) 0.38
Weibull (131650,0.6311) 0.28
Large losses Generalized Pareto (0.4857,35066000,22345000)Iranian bankers. In this regard, we presented the most im-
portant issues facing operational risk analysts and sug-
gested solutions for them through an all-inclusive
methodology. The first issue was lack of recorded oper-
ational loss, and the second problem was unreported large
losses in Iranian banking system. We suggested dividing
the severity distribution to different ranges and to deal
with each range separately. Moreover, scenario analysis
was used to enrich the loss database, provide examples of
magnificent losses, and exploit the opinion of experts.
The third issue discussed in this study was the depend-
ency structure of operational loss categories, where we
proposed t-copula for modeling. The presented method-
ology was employed to calculate the operational risk of
Karafarin Bank, and then, the successive steps of calcula-
tions and modeling in Karafarin Bank were reported.
This framework could be applied to other Iranian com-
mercial banks for modeling operational risk and for calcu-
lating the Capital-at-Risk of the bank. All aspects of this
research could be extended in various ways, provided
more complete and robust operational database (i.e., cells
of Table 1). Moreover, some researches could be con-
ducted using other multivariate copulas and compare the
results with the present work. Another interesting and un-
explored area is modeling operational risk with other
advanced measurement approaches rather than Loss Dis-
tribution Approach (presented here), like Bayesian
approaches, Neural networks, Fuzzy modeling, and so on.-Darling Cramer-von Mises Kolmogorov-Smirnov Log-likelihood
93 11.66666629 0.5592 671.1794
22 11.66666665 0.4688 758.4963
8 11.66660707 0.1817 583.895
41 11.66665921 0.3679 607.7055
56 11.66661431 0.1627 585.8375
86 11.66660781 0.1255 579.2755
68 11.66660625 0.0922 579.04
Table 11 CaR in different methodologies and their capital
requirements (IRR)




Basic Indicator Approach 1,288,019,455,849 64
Standardized Approach 1,264,472,491,808 63
This study 746,286,286,124 37
Karafarin Bank Capital (2010) 2,000,000,000,000








Retail banking Gamma Gamma
(4.9427,1495600000) (1.7654,84917000000)
Commercial banking Gamma Weibull
(5.8349,104890000) (35733000000,1.4442)
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http://www.jiei-tsb.com/content/8/1/15Endnotes
aBank Markazi.
bn is a random variable which follows the frequency
distribution.
c1 USD ﬃ 10; 600 Iranianrials IRRð Þ.
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